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Neural Correlates of Economic Inequality-Induced Increases in Risky Decision-Making 
A growing global trend: Income Inequality 
Social and economic inequality are at the heart of conversations happening in 
countries as wealthy as the United States to developing countries in Asia and Africa. While 
capitalism is often cited by academics and political scientists as being the driving force 
behind the burgeoning economic development of many nations and the declining rate of 
global poverty, others point out that there is also rapidly growing income inequality. Despite 
the fact that many countries such as China and India are seeing a growing middle class, the 
increasing accumulation of wealth by the top 1% of individuals in most modern societies 
signals that growing amounts of wealth does not necessitate equal, or some may say “fair” 
distribution of that wealth. Indeed, in the 1980s, Americans in the top 1% of the income 
bracket possessed less than 10% of total income in the United States, as compared to today, 
when the top 1% possess an astounding 22% of aggregate wealth (Saez & Zucman, 2016). 
While economic debates about what to do about this phenomenon are certainly present in 
modern discussions of political economy, social psychologists are interested in whether and 
how this global phenomenon is impacting individuals living in highly unequal societies. 
The effects of income inequality on society have been studied by psychologists and 
sociologists for decades, and more evidence is showing that this phenomenon has far-
reaching effects. For example, societies with higher levels of income inequality tend to have 
shorter life expectancies (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015), higher rates of crime (Choe, 2008), 
greater consumer debt (Freund, 2006), and higher rates of gambling (Frank, 2013) and risk-
taking behaviors (Payne, Brown-Iannussi, & Hannay, 2017). Income inequality data from 
various states is also correlated with internet search queries about risk-related searches such 
as “pay day loans” and “win money”—showing that states with higher income inequality 
reflect greater risk-related desires (Payne, Brown-Iannussi, & Hannay, 2017). Given that 
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perceptions of growing inequality may suggest a greater propensity to take risk, psychologists 
have studied how perceptions of inequality may relate to individuals’ perceived needs for 
economic and psychological self-fulfillment.  
Relative Deprivation 
 There are many potential psychological explanations for why people who are 
accumulating increasing amounts of wealth may still feel dissatisfied if the rate of their 
accumulation is less than that of others. In particular, psychologists have found growing 
evidence for the theory of relative deprivation, or the idea that one’s absolute wealth does not 
determine how one perceives whether one’s needs are fulfilled; rather, people determine their 
perceived needs by comparing their wealth to others—specifically, those who have more 
wealth than they do (Frank, 2013). In other words, no matter how rich a society becomes, 
people will continue to believe that they need to accumulate more wealth in order to feel 
fulfilled as long as they are dissatisfied with their relative ranking of annual income 
compared to others. For example, one study exposed participants to two scenarios and asked 
them to choose which they preferred: the first scenario was to live in a world where one earns 
$110,000 a year and everyone else earns $200,000 a year. In the second scenario, one would 
have the opportunity to earn less annual income—only $100,000 dollars a year, but everyone 
else would earn $85,000 as opposed to the $200,000 in scenario one. Traditional economics 
would predict that rationally, as self-interested individuals, most people would choose 
scenario one since one would have the opportunity to earn $10,000 more dollars a year 
compared to scenario two. However, the results found that the majority of individuals chose 
the second scenario—people care more about their wealth relative to others and not wealth 
per se (Frank, 2013).  
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 One of the ways behavioral scientists study economic decision-making in a multi-
person context is through the utilization of economic games. The most famous economic 
game, the ultimatum game, has been used in hundreds of studies and has been adapted across 
cultures (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen, 2003). The basic premise of the game 
is that there is one party who is deemed the “proposer”, who is given a fixed amount of 
money and is told that she can split it with another player, the “responder” who will 
determine whether to accept the amount given to them by the proposer or not. The proposer is 
told that if the responder does not accept how she split the fixed amount, then neither party 
will receive any compensation, but if the responder accepts whatever amount is given, then 
both parties will earn money based on how the proposer split the amount. While traditional 
economics would predict that self-interested humans should accept money no matter how 
small of an amount it is, studies employing the ultimatum game show that this is rarely the 
case, and that responders will “punish” proposers who do not split the wealth fairly (e.g. a 
responder might only accept receiving a minimum of three out of the ten dollars given to the 
proposer). These studies show that people are willing to forgo winning a certain amount of 
wealth if it means punishing a person who they perceive is winning more wealth at a higher 
rate (Oosterbeek, Sloof, & Van De Kuilen, 2004). In other words, people feel relatively 
deprived when they perceive their wealth accumulation as unacceptable compared to people 
accumulating more than them and adjust their perceived needs accordingly. 
Risk Sensitivity Theory 
 Given that we see individuals engaging in upward social comparison to determine 
their perceived needs in-line with the concept of relative deprivation, a logical question is to 
ask whether individuals experiencing such feelings of relative deprivation are more likely to 
alter their behavior to improve their relative ranking compared to others. In fact, myriad 
studies have led to the development of risk sensitivity theory—the proposition that as 
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individuals feel more and more deprived relative to others due to upward social comparison, 
the more risk they are willing to take to try and move up the social ladder (Stephens & Krebs, 
1986). The theory is originally based on animal research showing that when animals’ caloric 
intake is high, they are more risk-averse in their hunt for sustenance given that they do not 
have a high need for food at that specific time (Caraco, Martindale, & Whittam, 1980). 
Taking a risk to hunt for more food when an animal’s needs are already fulfilled seems like a 
bad decision. Similarly, since human needs are often shaped by relative deprivation, humans 
are more likely to be risk-seeking when they perceive their needs to be high and their social 
standing low, while being risk-averse when they perceive themselves to be at the top of the 
social ladder with their needs fulfilled. 
 A recent study by Payne and colleagues (2017) combined the concepts of risk 
sensitivity theory and relative deprivation to test participants’ decision-making choices under 
different levels of inequality. Two hundred and twenty-two subjects from an online 
participant pool were recruited to take part in a behavioral study testing three hypotheses. The 
first experiment sought to provide greater evidence for the theory of relative deprivation by 
supporting the idea that the majority of individuals determine their perceived needs by 
engaging in upward rather than downward social comparison (i.e. comparing your wealth to 
people who have more wealth than you and feeling deprived rather than comparing your 
wealth to people who have less wealth than you and feeling fulfilled). Therefore, if the 
experimenters could manipulate participants’ perceptions of how previous subjects performed 
on a wealth-accumulation task, most participants would perceive their performance as 
adequate only when they accumulate more wealth than the average participant (i.e. most 
people engage in upward social comparison). 
 Participants were shown several graphs purportedly showing previous subjects’ 
performance levels on each round of a gambling game. Half of participants were exposed to 
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one graph which showed that the top third of performers earned more money than the middle 
third which in turn earned more money than the bottom third but only by a small margin (i.e. 
low inequality across subjects; the top performers are not earning that much more than 
others). Meanwhile, the other half of participants were exposed to a graph displaying high 
inequality, whereby the top third of performers accrued a significantly higher amount than the 
middle third who in turn earned significantly more than the bottom third. After seeing these 
graphs, participants were then asked to indicate what minimum amount of money they would 
be satisfied in earning given previous subjects’ earnings (i.e. estimating perceived need). 
Finally, participants were then asked to make three gambles to earn real money. Each gamble 
involved five options which varied by both risk and reward. The least risky option involved 
earning the lowest amount of money (90% chance of winning $0.28, 10% chance of winning 
nothing), while the riskiest option involved earning the greatest amount of money (5% chance 
of winning $5, 95% of winning nothing). All the gambling options were equated in expected 
value, so subjects would essentially be informing the experimenters of their level of risk-
aversion given that all the gambling outcomes were equal in magnitude and differed only in 
risk. The riskiness of decision choices was coded by averaging the probability of not winning 
any money for the three rounds. 
 The results delineated that the first hypothesis was supported given that perceived 
need was higher in the high-inequality condition than the low-inequality condition (Payne, 
Brown-Iannussi, & Hannay, 2017). In addition, the researchers found that perceived need 
mediated the relationship between inequality and propensity to take risk. Higher inequality 
increased participants’ reports of perceived need which led to more risk-taking (Payne et al., 
2017). This study gives more evidence that the theory of relative deprivation can explain why 
peoples’ perceived needs shift when exposed to information about other individuals’ 
resources, wealth, or performance. 
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A follow-up study by the same researchers tested whether the results can be replicated 
in a within-subjects experiment with a slightly different design than the first. As before, 107 
subjects were shown various inequality graphs of how previous subjects performed (not real 
data) and played 30 rounds of the gambling game involving high risk/high reward and low 
risk/low reward choices. In this experiment however, subjects were shown three levels of 
inequality (low, medium, high) and did not simply choose a binary choice that was either low 
risk or high risk. Instead, subjects were instructed to use a sliding scale from 1 to 100 (1 
representing low risk/low reward and 100 representing high risk/high reward) despite not 
being able to see the numeric labels. This gave a much more precise measure of subjects’ 
willingness to take risks and increases the confidence associated with knowing subjects’ 
cognitions about relative preferences rather than anchoring at specific numbers (Payne et al., 
2017). As with the previous study, subjects’ preferences for risk were associated with 
inequality level manipulations, with high inequality manipulations showing riskier decision 
making and low inequality manipulations showing risk-averse decision making (Payne et al., 
2017). 
Prospect Theory 
The study of economic decision-making has taken a behaviorist turn in the late 
twentieth century and continues to the present day. Using findings from psychology, 
economists now understand that humans do not act in accordance with perfect self-interested 
rationality and that a number of heuristics and psychological mechanisms explain why we 
make irrational economic decisions that are often detrimental to our interests. One behaviorist 
theory that emerged recently to describe decision-making under risk is prospect theory. This 
theory posits that humans evaluate risky decisions involving gains and losses differently 
given that most individuals have a natural loss-aversion bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Loss aversion is the idea that an individual is more repelled by the possibility of losing a 
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specific amount of money than she is attracted by the possibility of gaining that same amount 
of money (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This means that people evaluate gains and losses 
differently, as losses have a more negative psychological effect than the positive 
psychological effect brought about from a gain. In fact, studies by behavioral economists 
suggest that losses are almost twice as psychologically salient as gains (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). For example, if an individual was presented with the choice of a sure loss 
of $50 or the choice of having a 50% chance of losing nothing but a 50% of losing $100, 
most individuals would choose the second, riskier option even though the expected value of 
both choices is a loss of $50. The idea of losing any amount of money is so discomforting 
that most people would risk losing $100 instead of $50 if it also means having the chance of 
avoiding loss altogether. The same finding is not found when asking individuals the same 
question about gains; most individuals prefer to win a sure $50 rather than choosing the 
option of a 50% chance of winning $0 or a 50% chance of winning $100 (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Prospect theory demonstrates that individuals tend to be risk-seeking 
when it comes to losses but risk-averse in relation to gains.  
The Neuroscience of Decision-Making Under Risk 
While behavioral results studying decision making in regards to inequality show 
interesting results, it is necessary to investigate the neurological underpinnings of cognitive 
processes that occur during decision making in order to adequately explain why such 
behavioral results appear. For example, it is not clear whether people are drawn to riskier 
decisions due to a loss of self-regulation, heightened reward activation, diminished sensitivity 
to loss, or some neurocognitive combination of these explanations. One study sought to 
investigate those specific aforementioned cognitive mechanisms in an innovative fMRI study 
investigating participant attitudes towards risk (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan & 
Schultz, 2009). 
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Thirteen subjects were invited to take part in a study where subjects first underwent a 
structural MRI scan during which experimenters also presented a continuous presentation of 
two options: a “safe” option where subjects had a 100% guarantee of earning a low amount of 
money, or an uncertain option involving risk. Subjects were shown these two options in a 
linear fashion, whereby the potential amount to be won in the risky condition kept increasing 
until subjects would switch from the sure option to the risky option (e.g. first presentation: 
“Would you rather have a 100% chance of winning $100 or a 50% chance of winning $101?” 
second presentation: “Would you rather have a 100% chance of winning $100 or a 50% 
chance of winning $105?). This “switch” would signify the exact point at which subjects are 
willing to take a risk in order to give up on the idea of a guaranteed win. The specific name 
for this point is the certainty equivalent (CE) which reflects the value assigned to the risky 
option (i.e. an indirect measuring of risk-aversion). Once each subject’s individual CE was 
identified, the experimenters used an algorithm to present subjects undergoing a subsequent 
functional MRI with two options: one with low variance and one with high variance but 
which had the exact same expected value (EV). E.g. 
Option 1: 50% chance of winning $40, 50% chance of winning $60 (EV=$50, low 
variance) 
Option 2: 50% chance of winning $10, 50% chance of winning $90 (EV=$50, high 
variance) 
The algorithm mentioned was designed so that subjects would choose the low risk option 
around 50% of the time (adaptive algorithm). Each subject underwent 80 trials (80 gambles) 
and a subject’s risk aversion was gathered by subtracting the differences of the CEs on the 
high variance condition from the CEs on the low variance condition. As expected, subjects’ 
CEs on high variance conditions were lower than low variance conditions (i.e. subjects are 
more likely to make a risker option/forgo a higher reward when there is low variance in 
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potential outcomes) (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan & Schultz, 2009). Subjects’ 
BOLD signal responses were recorded preceding the choice of safe alternatives and were 
then correlated with the value difference between high variance CEs and low variance CEs to 
demonstrate that the difference between CE values was correlated with ventral striatum 
activation (VS)—suggesting that VS is correlated with higher magnitude (i.e. reward) 
(Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan & Schultz, 2009).  
 Other brain regions were also found to be significantly correlated with specific aspects 
of subjects’ risk preferences. For example, before the time that subjects made their choices 
after stimulus presentation (i.e. decision time), the experimenters found dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC) activation to be able to predict whether subjects would choose either 
the high or low risk option (Christopoulos, Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan & Schultz, 2009). 
Specifically, dACC activity suggests greater risk-taking propensity and thus, higher dACC 
activity predicted a greater chance of a subject choosing the high-risk option (i.e. high 
variance option). Finally, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) activity was higher among subjects who 
were naturally more risk averse (i.e. subjects who had lower CEs during the MRI pre-
experiment task) and thus showed that subjects with risk-averse propensities showed 
significantly higher IFG activity than those without such an innate propensity (Christopoulos, 
Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan & Schultz, 2009). In summary, higher VS and dACC activity 
coupled with low IFG activity characterizes subjects with high risk-taking propensities—
suggesting that decision-making under risk is influenced by a combination of neurocognitive 
processes involving heightened reward activity and lower sensitivity to riskiness. While 
enlightening regarding the neural mechanisms leading to risk-taking, no known neuroimaging 
research has examined how economic inequality influences the neural mechanisms that 
underlie decision-making.  
Proposed Study  
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 In order to understand the neural mechanisms underlying risky decision-making when 
subjects’ perceptions of economic inequality are altered, my research team has conducted a 
number of behavioral studies seeking to replicate previous behavioral findings on the subject 
while using experimental paradigms that can be easily adapted to a neuroimaging study. Over 
the course of running these five studies we had to take into account a number of factors for 
our design that ensured results found behaviorally could be replicated in the confines of an 
fMRI experiment. For example, one of the challenges of maintaining significant BOLD 
signal responses in fMRI studies is the necessity of exposing participants to experimental 
designs that involve frequent presentation of stimuli so that cognitive processes of interest are 
continually engaged when such stimuli appear, and disengaged when such stimuli disappear. 
This means that multiple, identical stimulus presentations over a significant number of trials 
need to be shown to participants in order to evoke cognitive processes of interest (such as 
risky decision-making) to ensure sufficient BOLD signal activation. In addition to requiring 
many trials of the same stimulus, imaging studies require jitter time (the time between trials) 
to vary between conditions and between trials within the same condition. The reason for 
variable jitter time is to ensure precise measurement of how the hemodynamic response curve 
of the BOLD signals changes over time. Knowledge of this curve is necessary for researchers 
to make inferences about the level of neuronal activity occurring during distinct events within 
trials, specific cognitive processes that may be at play during different events within a trial, 
and functional connectivity between separate brain regions. Therefore, our behavioral tasks 
varied jitter time between trials from 500 ms to 2000 ms to minimize the risk of 
autocorrelation and make our tasks as adaptable to an imaging study as possible. 
While neuroscience studies have given explanations for how participants evaluate 
risky decisions, no neuroscience study to date has evaluated subjects’ risk-taking propensities 
when primed with varying levels of economic inequality. Given prior behavioral research 
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showing that high inequality manipulations lead to higher incidences of risk-taking, we 
hypothesize that when processing high inequality trials, subjects will show greater activation 
in reward-related regions of the brain like the ventral striatum. Given findings from risk 
sensitivity theory, we also hypothesize that subjects will show decreased activation in brain 
regions that process loss-aversion, cognitive conflict, and cognitive control in order to make a 
risky decision. These brain regions include the amygdala, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex.  Finally, we hypothesize that since higher cognitive control is 
associated with lower risk-taking, there will be an inverse activation relationship between 
brain regions associated with reward activation and cognitive control in order for subjects to 
make riskier decisions on high inequality trials. 
While ultimately the goal of this program of research is to explore how economic 
inequality influences neural underpinnings of risk, for the purposes of the present thesis, I 
will focus on the behavioral pilot studies we conducted to develop a task suitable for use in a 
future fMRI study that will test the neural hypotheses outlined above. 
Behavioral Studies 
Study 1 
In the first behavioral study we conducted, we wanted to replicate the findings of 
Payne et. al’s (2017) study on how perceptions of inequality affect decision-making under 
risk, while adding in a component allowing us to measure how inequality influences 
sensitivity to reward (independent of risk). If bottom-up reward processing is one of the main 
factors influencing peoples’ decisions to make riskier decisions, then adding in this 
component along with inequality manipulations might help us understand different cognitive 
processes occurring during decision-making.  
The two hypotheses for this experiment are that participants who are primed with a 
high inequality graph will choose a high risk/high reward option more frequently than a low 
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risk/low reward option, compared to being primed with the low inequality manipulation 
given what we know from risk sensitivity theory and relative deprivation. Further, we 
hypothesized that on high stakes trials, participants would be less likely to choose the high 
risk/high reward option compared to low stakes trials, given behavioral findings from 
numerous experiments supporting prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Methods 
Participants 
 Study participants were undergraduate students (N = 13) enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course who completed the research study for course credit and $5 dollars in 
compensation. All participants signed up for the study through the scheduling software 
SONA throughout the month of October and completed the study in a quiet laboratory room. 
All participants provided written informed consent after all procedures were thoroughly 
explained, in accordance with procedures approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   
Procedure 
 Subjects were introduced to the research assistant guiding them through the 
experiment and were asked to be seated in front of a computer monitor showing a PowerPoint 
slide titled “Decision Game”. After filling out a consent form, the research assistant sat next 
to the participant and read out an experimental script while scrolling through the PowerPoint 
to explain the details of the game. The research assistant explained that the participant would 
be playing a decision game whereby the objective was to win as many points as possible and 
that, in addition to the $5 dollars in compensation, participants would have the opportunity to 
win extra money based on the average amount of points they earned from all rounds of the 
game. The research assistant would then show a slide on the PowerPoint explaining how the 
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game would proceed, first showing the bar graph and explaining how the data represented 
previous participants data and that the bar graph was present to contextualize how previous 
participants performed during a specific round in the game. The first bar graph participants 
saw was a high inequality bar graph where participants were told that in that specific round, 
the top third of previous participants performed much better than the middle third of players, 
who in turn performed much better than the bottom third of players. Participants were then 
shown a low inequality graph with very little variability—supposedly indicating that previous 
participants who completed the task all earned a similar amount of points. 
 Afterwards subjects were told that they would see a fixation cross indicating a pause, 
and were then shown an example of two options they could choose from: a high risk/high 
reward option or a low risk/low reward option. Participants were told that they would have 
5000 ms to make their decision and that not making a decision within 5000 ms meant they 
would gain 0 points from that round. If participants had no clarifying questions, they would 
then complete 10 practice trials of the experiment and were told that the research assistant 
would leave the room for the participant to complete the real experiment once the participant 
felt comfortable and did not wish to redo the practice trials. Subjects were told that the 180 
trials would take around 45 minutes to complete. Once completed, subjects filled out a 
debriefing survey about their experience making decisions by answering questions about how 
they decided when to make a high risk or a low risk decision, whether they thought the game 
was too fast or slow, and whether they felt their mind wandering during the game. Subjects 
were then debriefed about the actual purpose of the experiment and were informed that 
deception was used in order to derive valid results about how participants make decisions 
under different inequality conditions. Subjects were asked whether they believed the 
inequality graphs came from real subjects or whether they thought the data was not real. 
Finally, participants then received course credit and were compensated. 
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Decision-Making Paradigm 
 Subjects completed the decision-making game on a computer monitor using the 
software PsychoPy. The paradigm was identical to how a participant would view the stimulus 
in an fMRI scanner and was adapted from Payne’s et. al (2017) recent study that was 
previously mentioned. Subjects would first see a bar graph showing how the top, middle, and 
bottom thirds of previous subjects performed (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 
Bar graphs would either have high or low variability to indicate high or low levels of 
inequality. The bar graph would then stay on the screen for two seconds followed by a 
fixation cross that appeared for a time period between 500 ms and 2000 ms (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 
Subjects would then see a stakes trial represented by either an orange or purple circle 
indicating whether the round they were about to compete for had a high or low number of 
points at stake for 2000 ms (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 
Low stake trials were defined as having an expected value ranging from 3 to 17 (Figure 4), 
while high stake trials were defined as having an expected value ranging from 33 to 47.  
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
 
Expected value was calculated by multiplying the probability of winning a specific number of 
points by the value of those points. Thus, within each high or low stake trial, subjects would 
see two white boxes (Figure 5) with one box indicating a low risk, low reward option and 
another box indicating a high risk, high reward selection (Low risk was defined as a win 
probability of 75% - 90% and high risk was defined as a win probability of 10% - 25%). The 
expected values of both boxes were the same in order to gauge subjects’ pure levels of risk 
aversion without any confounds. 
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Subjects would then have 5000 ms to make their decision between the two options by 
pressing the left arrow key for option 1 and the right arrow key for option 2. The bar graph 
remained present during the decision-making period on the top-left section of the screen to 
remind subjects of how previous participants performed. Thus, subjects were exposed to a 2 
by 2 design whereby 45 trials would be high inequality high stake trials, 45 trials would be 
high inequality low stake trials, 45 trials would be low inequality high stakes trials, and 45 
trials would be low inequality, low stake trials. 
Risk-taking Propensity  
 Subjects’ risk-taking propensities in gambling decisions were calculated by counting 
the number of trials in which subjects chose the high risk/high reward option in high 
inequality conditions compared to low inequality conditions. Participants who display a 
tendency to choose the high risk/high reward option after seeing previous participants’ 
alleged performance showing high variability (i.e. high inequality) more frequently 
demonstrate higher propensities to make riskier decisions due to upward social comparison.  
Results 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to compare the main effects of 
inequality level (2 levels: high, low) and stake level (2 levels: high, low) and the interaction 
between inequality and stake on the percentage of high risk, high reward responses chosen by 
participants. The main effect for level of stakes yielded an F ratio of F(1, 12) = 7.218, p = 
0.02, indicating that participants made significantly fewer high risk, high reward choices 
during high stakes trials (M = 0.308, SD = 0.239) compared to low stakes trials (M = 0.461, 
SD = 0.221). The main effect for level of inequality yielded an F ratio of F(1, 12) = 3.758, p 
= 0.058, indicating, that participants made marginally-fewer high risk, high reward choices 
during conditions of high inequality (M = 0.313, SD = 0.196) compared to low inequality (M 
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= 0.455, SD = 0.262). The interaction of stake and inequality effect was not significant, F(2, 
12) = 0.185, p > 0.05.  
 
Figure 6 
Discussion 
 The results of this first study delineated that both hypotheses were not supported and 
that participants actually showed the opposite effect, making riskier decisions when stakes 
where high and when inequality was low. This is surprising considering that individuals tend 
to show greater relative deprivation when exposed to high inequality manipulations (Frank, 
2013; Payne et. al, 2017). Although the risk-taking task for this study was not identical (i.e. 
used binary choices) to Payne et. al’s study which used a continuous scale to measure risk-
taking propensity, it is unlikely that these results appeared due to a difference in the risk-
taking task. 
 Furthermore, 78% of participants reported on the post-study survey that the inequality 
graphs seemed strange because they lacked descriptiveness (Figure 1), and seemed like they 
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were repetitions of the same graph given the very slight visual differences between different 
inequality figures (Figure 7) which could have reduced ecological validity.  
 
Figure 7: Three graphs all in the high inequality condition 
Study 2 
Due to the lack of replication of Payne et. al’s (2017) findings, and statistics 
suggesting subjects found the decision game extremely long and uninteresting, we decided to 
eliminate the potential confounding factor that might have eliminated the prospect of our 
subjects’ decisions and perceived needs being influenced by the inequality graphs; thus, we 
decided to eliminate the orange and purple circles representing stakes. The elimination of the 
stakes events would force participants to only consider the inequality manipulation when 
making their decisions and would also reduce the overall study time to maintain participants’ 
attention.  
The hypothesis for the second iteration of our study was adjusted to account for the 
elimination of the stakes trial; consistent with Payne et al. (2017), we hypothesized that the 
high inequality condition would lead to greater incidences of choosing the high risk/high 
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reward option among participants, and that the low inequality condition would lead to greater 
incidences of choosing the low risk/low reward condition.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Similar to the first study, study participants were undergraduate students (N=23) 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course who completed the research study for course 
credit and $5 dollars in compensation. All participants provided written informed consent 
after all procedures were thoroughly explained, in accordance with procedures approved by 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   
Procedure 
 Subjects were escorted by a research assistant who explained the decision game, the 
meaning of the bar graphs, and collected informed consent from the participant exactly 
identical to the first study with the exclusion of any information about the stake trials. Post-
study surveys did not include questions about stake trials or the meaning of the orange and 
purple circle. 
Decision-Making Paradigm 
 Subjects again completed the decision-making game on a computer monitor using the 
software PsychoPy. The task was identical to the first study with the exception that the stake 
trials were excluded. The bar graph remained present during the decision-making period on 
the top-left section of the screen to remind subjects of how previous participants performed. 
Thus, subjects were exposed to 90 trials of high inequality graphs and 90 trials of low 
inequality graphs.  
Risk-taking Propensity  
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 Subjects’ risk-taking propensities in the decision game were calculated exactly like 
they were in the first study. Expected values between the high risk/high reward and low 
risk/low reward choices was equal across all trials to isolate the effect of the inequality 
manipulation on participants decisions. 
Results 
After aggregating the number of high and low risk decisions participants made under 
both high and low inequality conditions, we found that under conditions of high inequality, 
participants chose the high risk, high reward choice 57.3% of the time. By contrast, 
participants chose the high risk, high reward choice under the low inequality condition only 
46.7% of the time (Figure 8). After conducting a paired t-test to test if the difference was 
significant, we found that the difference between the two conditions was significant at the 0.1 
but not the 0.05 level t(22) = 1.764, p = 0.092. Overall, 14 out of the 23 participants made 
more high risk, high reward decisions under the condition of high inequality compared to the 
low inequality condition.  
 
Figure 8 
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Discussion 
 After excluding the stakes trials from the second study, we found that the pattern of 
results found in the first study was almost reversed, with the majority of participants now 
choosing the high risk, high reward option under conditions of high inequality as we 
hypothesized. Despite results not being significant at the 0.05 alpha level, the difference in 
the results between the first and the second pilot definitely suggests that the stake trials had 
an influence on participants’ decision-making during the game. As previously mentioned in 
Payne et. al’s (2017) study, the inequality manipulations used were shown to significantly 
affect participants self-reported needs (what number of points they would be satisfied 
winning), with high inequality exposure increasing self-reported needs. This second 
behavioral pilot may suggest that the inequality graphs may have influenced participants 
perceived needs despite only offering them a binary choice between a high risk, high reward 
option and a low risk, low reward option instead of a continuous scale, and that a larger 
sample size may have led to a significant effect at the 0.05 alpha level. 
Study 3  
 After analyzing the results of the first and second studies, it seemed that the first study 
suggested that people were ignoring the inequality manipulation but that their decision-
making was affected by the stake trials; the second study suggested that peoples’ decisions 
were influenced by inequality manipulations at the 0.1 alpha level. Given these two 
observations, our third study sought to combine the stake and inequality manipulations again 
but in a way that would isolate the effects of these two manipulations. The reason we were 
still interested in the stake trials is because we were thinking of the purpose such trials would 
serve in an imaging study; stake trials could be a way to localize each individual participant’s 
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bottom-up reward processing and anticipation in areas such as the ventral striatum which may 
hold predictive significance for understanding participants’ decisions to take a risk or not.  
 After reading some of our participants’ survey responses concerning the believability 
and descriptiveness of the inequality graphs, we also decided to change the way we described 
what the inequality graphs represented to potentially increase the validity of our 
manipulation. Instead of only including two levels of inequality, we added a medium level of 
inequality to add variability and make it less likely for participants to question the graphs 
based on their repetitiveness. In addition, graphs were presented in one of three colors 
indicating that the data they represented came from averaging previous subjects’ overall 
average responses throughout the “previous games”, instead of responses based on specific 
individual trials. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Study participants were undergraduate students (N=16) enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course who completed the research study for course credit and $5 dollars in 
compensation. All participants provided written informed consent after all procedures were 
thoroughly explained, in accordance with procedures approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   
Procedure 
 Subjects were escorted by a research assistant who explained the decision game, the 
meaning of the bar graphs, the stake trials, and collected informed consent from the 
participant as done in the first study. Unlike the first study, participants were told that they 
would either see an inequality graph or a colored circle (stake trial) before they had to make a 
decision but did not see both in any one trial.  
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Decision-Making Paradigm 
 Subjects again completed the decision-making game on a computer monitor using the 
software PsychoPy. The task was identical to the first study with the exception that the stake 
trials and inequality trials were not shown together within any one trial. Subjects were either 
exposed to a stake stimulus or an inequality graph. The bar graph remained present during the 
decision-making period on the top-left section of the screen to remind subjects of how 
previous participants performed during inequality trials. Subjects were exposed to 40 trials of 
high inequality graphs and 40 trials of low inequality graphs, and 10 trials of medium 
inequality graphs. Medium inequality graphs were included to increase the believability of 
the graphs, but were not actually included in data analyses in order to have enough trials of 
high and low inequality to analyze. In addition, subjects were exposed to 45 high stakes and 
45 low stakes trials. 
 Risk-taking Propensity  
 Subjects’ risk-taking propensities in the decision game were calculated identically to 
the first two studies. Expected values between the high risk/high reward and low risk/low 
reward choices were equal across trials. 
Results 
Upon analyzing trials of high stakes, low stakes, high inequality, and low inequality, 
we found very little difference in the responses of participants in each condition (Figure 9). In 
the inequality conditions, the percentage of high risk, high reward choices under the high 
inequality condition (M = 54.4%) and the low inequality condition (M = 55.6%) were almost 
identical and did not differ significantly t (15) = - 0.184, p > 0.05. For the stakes trials (Figure 
10), the difference in the percentage of high risk, high reward choices under the high stakes 
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condition (M = 45.0%) and the low stakes condition (M = 49.7%) was not significant t(15) = 
- 0.647, p > 0.05. 
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 10 
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 Unlike the first study, including both the stake and inequality trials in this study did 
not lead to seeing the opposite effect whereby subjects were more likely to choose the risker 
option on conditions of low inequality. However, the results found that there was practically 
no difference in how subjects responded to trials of high versus low inequality (Figure 9). 
Reasons for why these results may have arisen might be due to the fact that subjects might 
have found it difficult to switch their strategy of completing the task when they didn’t know 
how often they would see a stake versus an inequality trial.  
Study 4 
The third study’s results attempting to isolate inequality and stake manipulations in 
order to see whether participants’ strategies would be influenced by both stake and inequality 
in isolation suggested that task-switching eliminated any effects of these manipulations. 
While Study 1 suggested that stake trials influence participant responses when stakes are 
presented before inequality (i.e. subjects ignored inequality and were only influenced by 
stakes) and Study Two suggested that inequality manipulations in isolation (i.e., with no 
stakes information) have an effect on participant responses, study three suggests that 
attempting to isolate the effect of both in a within-subjects design is ineffective. Given that 
Study Two suggested inequality manipulations have an effect when they are presented 
without any other manipulations, we reused the inequality manipulations from Study Two in 
this study but sought to change our risk taking measure.  
The first three studies presented participants with a binary choice of either choosing a 
low risk, low reward or a high risk, high reward option. While this binary design helps us 
gauge participants’ level of individual risk aversion and how inequality might affect it, we 
thought that a continuous response of choosing various intermediate levels of risk and reward 
might be more helpful in providing us with data about how inequality manipulations affect 
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participant response choices on a more granular level that replicates the design of Payne’s et 
al. gambling study using tokens (2017). Further, use of more continuous measure of risk-
taking would make the ultimate analysis of fMRI data to be collected in a future study more 
powerful. 
 Methods 
Participants 
 Study participants were undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course who completed the research study for course credit and $5 in 
compensation. All participants provided written informed consent after all procedures were 
thoroughly explained, in accordance with procedures approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   
Procedure 
 Subjects were escorted by a research assistant who explained the decision game, the 
meaning of the bar graphs and the spinners, and collected informed consent from the 
participant as done in the first study. Unlike Study 3, subjects were told that the computer 
would spin the selected spinner, but no such spin took place. Subjects were told that spinners 
could be one of four types (Figure 11) but that spinners do not actually differ significantly in 
point value.  
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Figure 11 
Four types were included to make the decision game more realistic to a real-life gambling 
game that includes a more diverse possibility of gambles. The study was identical to the first 
and second study, starting with the inequality graph presentation (Figure 1), followed by a 
fixation cross (Figure 2) and a decision screen (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12 
Decision-Making Paradigm 
 Subjects took part in a decision-making game on a computer monitor using the 
software PsychoPy. Instead of a being presented with two response selections (Figure 4), 
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subjects were instead exposed to 9 spinners, each differing in risk and reward on a continuous 
basis (Figure 12). As shown in the figure, the leftmost spinner has 12 different slots with 9 of 
those slots having a low reward (20 points) while the rightmost spinner has 12 slots with only 
3 of those slots having some number of points, but those points represent a high reward (60 
points). Subjects were told that they could also choose from one of the 7 intermediate 
spinners between the two extremes, but spinners for each of the 9 choices was not shown. 
Instead, subjects only saw the leftmost, middle, and rightmost spinner and were told that the 
computer would “spin” the choice they selected and accumulate points earned throughout the 
game.  
Inequality graphs were similar to those used in Study 3 in that subjects were told each 
different-colored graph came from a different study (Figure 13), with subjects exposed to five 
different possible colors all with various levels of inequality (low, medium, or high).  
 
Figure 13 
The bar graph remained present during the decision-making period on the top-left 
section of the screen to remind subjects of how previous participants performed. Subjects 
were exposed to 40 trials of high inequality graphs and 40 trials of low inequality graphs, and 
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10 trials of medium inequality graphs. Medium inequality graphs were included to increase 
the believability of the graphs but were not actually included in data analyses.  
Risk-taking Propensity  
 Subjects’ risk-taking propensities were calculated by seeing what spinner they chose 
to spin on each trial. Spinners 5 through 9 (middle to rightmost spinner) are considered higher 
risk and higher reward since there is a higher chance of not winning any points on these 
spinners but a higher number of points at stake. Spinners 1 through 5 (leftmost to middle 
spinner) are considered low risk, low reward given there is a high chance of winning some 
points, even though those points are low in value. 
Results 
 After aggregating the number of high and low risk decisions participants made under 
both high and low inequality conditions, we found very little difference between the two 
conditions. Under the high inequality condition, subjects scored an average of 5.16 (i.e. chose 
the middle spinner on average) and under the low inequality condition they scored an average 
of 5.00 (i.e. chose the middle spinner on average) indicating a moderate amount of risk 
aversion. One participant was excluded from the analysis (n = 18) due to always choosing the 
riskiest spinner under conditions of high inequality (i.e. scored a 9) which was a score above 
two standard deviations of the average (M = 5.00, SD = 1.49). A paired-samples t-test 
analysis indicated that there were no significant differences between the two conditions t (17) 
= 0.240, p > 0.05. 
Discussion 
 Trying to estimate individuals’ level of risk-aversion using a more granular decision-
paradigm including a scale with 9 different levels of risk and reward didn’t yield a difference 
between inequality conditions. The spinners concept was a novel one that has not been tested 
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in paradigms testing similar psychological constructs and could have failed to modulate 
psychological processes of interest related to risk analysis and social comparison. The fact 
that subjects could not see the selected spinner actually “spin” nor see the outcome of their 
choices might have led to habitual decision-making that was not strongly influenced by the 
inequality manipulations.  
Study 5 
 The fourth study failed to provide a convincing continuous measure of subjects’ level 
of risk propensity in decision-making due to the use of a novel experimental paradigm 
(spinners) that has not been used before to answer similar questions about decision-making. 
However, one task that has been widely used and is correlated with many real-world 
decisions concerning risk-tasking such as smoking, drug use, sexual risk-taking, and unsafe 
driving behaviors (Helfinstein et al., 2014) is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). In 
this task, subjects are exposed to a balloon that they can pump up to accumulate a fixed 
amount of points per pump and win those points if they cash out after their last successful 
pump. Balloons explode after a set number of pumps that subjects are unaware of, whereby 
the set number varies on each trial. This task is popular among researchers due to its 
ecological validity as it resembles many real-world decision games where further 
continuation of an activity increases risk of loss as well as magnitude of reward (e.g. 
gambling, betting). Furthermore, this task has been used in numerous neuroimaging studies 
and is therefore easily adaptable given our main goal from these pilots is to use behavioral 
findings to support neural hypotheses about cognitive processes of interest such as reward 
processing, social comparison, self-regulation, and sensitivity to loss. The main goal of 
conducting this study was to see if inequality manipulations could modulate participants’ risk 
propensity when it came to pumping balloons (risky decision) or cashing out (safe option).  
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Methods 
Participants 
Study participants were undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course who completed the research study for course credit and $5 in 
compensation. All participants provided written informed consent after all procedures were 
thoroughly explained, in accordance with procedures approved by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   
Procedure 
Subjects were escorted by a research assistant who explained the BART, the meaning 
of the bar graphs, and collected informed consent from the participant as done all the 
previous pilots. Subjects were shown a PowerPoint illustrating how the BART game works as 
well as the two possible outcomes that may arise (cashing out successfully and earning points 
vs. balloon explosion and losing all points for that trial). Inequality graphs were one of three 
colors indicating that the data they represented came from three different studies as opposed 
to Study Four that included more studies. We decided to limit the colors back to three given 
Study Four’s findings were not significant and given that the graphs looked relatively similar, 
so we assumed subjects’ suspicions might have actually increased if we increased the number 
of purported studies to a great extent. The study started by showing an inequality graph 
(Figure 14), followed by a fixation cross (Figure 15) and a balloon screen (Figure 16).  
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Figure 14 
 
 
Figure 15 
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A research assistant then pumped up the example balloon three times (Figure 17) and 
cashed out to show the participant the positive feedback she would receive for cashing out 
successfully (Figure 18). The research assistant then went through a round where the balloon 
exploded after four pumps so that the subject could see what an explosion looks like (Figure 
19).  
Figure 16 
 
Figure 17 
 
Figure 18 
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Figure 19 
Subjects were then given the opportunity of completing 10 practice trials (10 
balloons) and then started the real game. All subjects took a debriefing survey asking them 
about their thoughts and feeling throughout the BART as well as whether they found the 
graphs believable or strange.  
Decision-Making Paradigm 
 Subjects completed the BART on a computer monitor using the software PsychoPy. 
The task consisted of seeing a grey balloon (Figure 16) and the words “pump up” and “cash 
out” on the bottom left and bottom right of the balloon. Subjects would press the left arrow to 
pump up the balloon and the right arrow key to cash out. The balloon would marginally 
increase in size every time the subject decided to pump up the balloon (Figure 17). If a 
balloon was pumped beyond a pre-specified limit (that varied on each trial), the balloon 
would explode (Figure 19). 
Risk-taking Propensity  
 Unlike the first three studies, subjects were not exposed to a binary choice between a 
low risk, low reward or a high risk, high reward option, nor were they asked to choose the 
level of risk and reward from a continuous scale as in Study 4. This study allowed subjects to 
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experiment with pumping and cashing out balloons and gave subjects feedback on their 
decisions (either showing subjects how many points they earned for their successful pumps 
(Figure 18) or showing an exploded balloon indicating zero points earned for that trial 
(Figure 19)).  
Results 
Unlike the first three studies with binary choices between low risk, low reward and 
high risk, high reward options, this study averaged the number of pumps on cash-out trials 
(i.e., trials where the balloon was cashed out successfully) and all trials (i.e. cash-out and 
explosion trials) under conditions of high and low inequality to estimate inequality’s effect on 
risk taking. Similarly, subjects’ balloon pumps on cash-out trials under conditions of high 
inequality (M = 5.37, SD = 1.29) were significantly greater than under conditions of low 
inequality (M = 4.85, SD = 0.98), t (19) = 2.327, p = 0.031. 
 
Figure 20 
Discussion 
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From running five behavioral pilots we found that study two and study five yielded 
significant results (Table 1) and that the BART was ultimately the best option to use due to 
its robust effects in previously conducted neuroimaging studies. In addition, Study 5’s results 
showed that inequality did have an effect on subjects’ alleged risk taking (as measured by 
pump number) using the BART paradigm. Despite the BART having never been used in any 
previous studies concerning risk-taking under inequality manipulations, we believe adapting 
this behavioral paradigm to a neuroimaging study is possible given the considerations needed 
for a within-subjects neuroimaging study, including: having enough trials under both high 
and low inequality conditions (including a varied number of pumps under each condition), 
variable jitter time between trials and events, as well as continuous engagement of social-
cognitive processes such as upward social comparison (e.g. when subjects are exposed to 
high inequality manipulations) and reward processing. Due to the measurement of risk taking 
using a continuous variable (pump numbers) rather than binary choices, the BART paradigm 
also allows for the use of parametric modulation analyses to better isolate several 
neurocognitive mechanisms and provide explanations for questions related to risk processing.  
General Discussion 
 Our results suggest that inequality manipulations modulate risk-taking in a multitude 
of economic games involving risk (binary selections between low risk/low reward, high 
risk/high reward games as well as the BART) within the same subject. As mentioned 
previously, the reality of humans being inherently social beings makes it unsurprising that we 
fulfill our needs by looking at the amount of wealth that others have or accumulate. Overall, 
absolute wealth does not seem to matter when our basic needs are met; wealth is about 
perception, and perception is guided by our social comparisons in relation to others. It is 
fascinating to find that despite individuals all varying along various levels of risk-aversion 
and risk-seeking, inequality seems to affect the decision to be risk-seeking or risk-averse 
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within most subjects to different extents. With income inequality rising globally at an 
astonishing rate, it is important to understand how such findings will impact social cohesion 
and economic prosperity in different societies.  
The first study we conducted failed to replicate the findings of Payne et al. (2017) due 
to the presence of stakes as well as inequality, which may suggest that subjects use selective 
attention when making fast-paced decisions—attending to specific cues that will expedite 
their decision-making process. From what we know from evolutionary psychology about the 
role of the unconscious in helping us make quick and efficient decisions, it might not be 
surprising that individuals in the first study seemed to neglect or otherwise feel overwhelmed 
by two manipulations (stakes and inequality) in their decision-making and relied on the easier 
cue (stakes) to influence their decisions. In fact, dropping the stake manipulation in the 
second pilot led to the replication of Payne et al.’s (2017) findings at the 0.1 alpha level—
with higher inequality leading to higher reported selection of the high risk, high reward 
option (Table 1). However, this replication was only significant for our purposes due to the 
fact that we increased the number of trials to 90 in each condition to make the study design 
adaptable to an imaging experiment.  
The third and fourth pilot studies yielded insignificant results, with the third pilot 
reincorporating the stake manipulation but separating trials into inequality and stake trials in 
hopes that subjects will not focus on any one manipulation. However, we found that 
inequality’s effect on decision-making was again eliminated in this case, possibly due to 
difficulty in cognitive switching as subjects attend to two different cues in a short span of 
time. The fourth study included the idea of using spinners as a novel way to study economic 
decision-making in a format similar to how a real-world gamble would be conducted, but the 
fact that the spinners did not actually spin or give feedback to subjects probably led to the 
insignificant results that we found. 
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Finally, our fifth and final study included the use of a commonly-used task, the 
BART, which yielded significant findings at the 0.05 alpha level. Since the task has been 
linked to a number of real-world decisions (Helfinstein et al., 2014), it is interesting to find 
that inequality can actually shift an individual’s decision to pump a balloon further or cash-
out. This pilot replicated the results of Payne et al. (2017) by showing how higher inequality 
affected individuals’ perceived needs which led to greater balloon pumps in order to meet 
those needs. Further research should investigate the neural underpinnings of risk-taking when 
exposed to inequality in performance, outcomes, and resources in order to better understand 
the variety of human experience and reactions to those experiences in increasingly unequal 
societies throughout the world.  
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 
Rationale for 
Conducting Study  
• Localize bottom-
up reward 
processing using 
stakes  
• Manipulate 
inequality to 
influence risk 
aversion 
• Isolate 
inequality 
manipulation 
by eliminating 
stake trials 
• Re-integrate 
stakes 
component but 
only show 
either 
inequality or 
stake 
manipulation 
• Use a 
continuous 
measure of 
risk aversion 
instead of a 
binary choice 
• Use an easily 
adaptable 
decision 
paradigm that 
gives a 
continuous 
measure of 
risk 
Results and 
Findings 
- Low inequality, 
low stake trials 
led to more risky 
decisions 
- Higher 
inequality led 
to more risky 
decisions 
- No clear 
pattern or 
relationship 
- No clear 
pattern or 
relationship 
- Higher 
inequality led 
to more risk 
(i.e. more 
pumping) 
Statistical 
Significance 
Significant at the 0.05 
level 
Significant at the 
0.1 level 
No significance No significance Significant at the 
0.05 level 
Table 1 
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